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abstract: Strong reciprocity, defined as a predisposition to help
others and to punish those that are not helping, has been proposed
as a potent force leading to the evolution of cooperation and altruism.
However, the conditions under which strong reciprocity might be
favored are not clear. Here we investigate the selective pressure on
strong reciprocity by letting both limited dispersal (i.e., spatial struc-
ture) and recombination between helping and punishment jointly
determine the evolutionary dynamics of strong reciprocity. Our an-
alytical model suggests that when helping and punishment are per-
fectly linked traits (no recombination occurring between them),
strong reciprocity can spread even when the initial frequency of
strong reciprocators is close to 0 in the population (i.e., a rare mutant
can invade). By contrast, our results indicate that when recombi-
nation can occur between helping and punishment (i.e., both traits
coevolve) and is stronger than selection, punishment is likely to
invade a population of defectors only when it gives a direct fitness
benefit to the actor. Overall, our results delineate the conditions
under which strong reciprocity is selected for in a spatially structured
population and highlight that the forces behind its evolution involves
kinship (be it genetic or cultural).
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Explaining the evolution of cooperative and altruistic be-
haviors in humans and other species is a fundamental
problem in biology and the social sciences. Models predict
that under situations devoid of reputation or repeated in-
teractions, individuals should not help unrelated individ-
uals (Hamilton 1964a; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). How-
ever, results of experiments with humans are in apparent
contrast with this prediction because they have repeatedly
shown that, in one-shot interactions, individuals behave
more cooperatively than predicted under one-shot inter-
action models (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). It has been
suggested that this paradox could be resolved by the ob-
served tendency of cooperators to engage in costly pun-
ishment of noncooperators (Gintis 2000, 2003; Fehr and
Fischbacher 2003; Gintis et al. 2003; Bowles and Gintis
2004). The general idea is that humans are strong recip-
rocators, defined as individuals bearing a propensity to
help others and to punish those that are not helping (Gintis
2000), where both helping and punishing are assumed to
be costly and result in no direct economic benefit.
The idea that punishment of defectors can enforce the
evolution of helping behaviors between unrelated individ-
uals is not new (Hirshleifer and Rasmusen 1989; Boyd and
Richerson 1992). However, the conditions under which
such punishment may evolve in a population consisting
initially of defectors remains unclear. While several authors
have proposed that strong reciprocity represents a solution
to the puzzle of the evolution of helping behaviors in
humans (Gintis 2000, 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003;
Gintis et al. 2003; Bowles and Gintis 2004), others recently
suggested that punishment cannot promote the evolution
of helping behaviors in any interesting situation when
punishing itself is a costly behavior (Gardner et al. 2006).
In order to identify the causes leading to such contrasting
views, a starting point is a discussion by Boyd and Rich-
erson (1992) of a simple model of helping and punish-
ment. These authors studied the evolution of a so-called
cooperator-punisher strategy in a randomly mixing pop-
ulation and showed that when there is a first round of
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interaction where individuals can help each other and an-
other round where they can punish nonhelpers, strong
reciprocators can invade a population of unconditional
defectors when the inequality
pD 1 C  (1 p)C (1)H P
is satisfied. The right side of this inequality is the cost
of expressing the act of helping plus the costC (1H
of expressing the act of punishment, where p is thep)C P
frequency of strong reciprocators in the population. The
left side of the inequality is the benefit of not being pun-
ished, which depends on the damage resulting fromD
punishment times the frequency of strong reciprocators
in the population. According to the inequality, helping and
punishing becomes a better option than defecting in terms
of direct fitness benefits when the frequency p of strong
reciprocators exceeds an initial threshold frequency de-
termined by the costs and benefits of helping and pun-
ishment. However, when the initial frequency of strong
reciprocators is close to 0 ( ), strong reciprocatorsp r 0
cannot invade the population because their fitness is al-
ways lower than the fitness of defectors (Sigmund et al.
2001).
Three questions emerge when considering the condi-
tions for the evolution of strong reciprocity given by in-
equality (1). The first is whether limited dispersal (spatial
population subdivision) and the resulting kin selection
effects may allow strong reciprocity to evolve even when
the initial frequency of strong reciprocators is close to 0
(i.e., whether a rare mutant can invade). The impact of
population subdivision on the evolution of strong reci-
procity has been studied in simulations by Bowles and
Gintis (2004), who suggested that kin selection is absent
from their model and that limited dispersal is the key factor
promoting the evolution of altruistic punishment. How-
ever, their simulations do not allow us to disentangle the
role of kin selection and direct fitness benefits. Further,
their findings that strong reciprocity evolves under limited
dispersal possibly stems from the fact that punishment
spreads simply because punishers reduce the intensity of
competition at a local scale by decreasing the fecundity of
competitors, thereby increasing their own reproductive
success. Such punishment would therefore qualify as being
selfish (self-interest) rather than altruistic because the act
of punishment results in an increase of the expected num-
ber of adult offspring of a focal punisher (i.e., fitness sensu
Hamilton 1964a, 1970; e.g., Grafen 1985; Rousset 2004;
Lehmann and Keller 2006). The role of population sub-
division has also been studied analytically by Nakamaru
and Iwasa (2005, 2006). However, their analyses assume
overlapping generations, a feature that by itself can lead
to the evolution of helping in spatially structured popu-
lations (Taylor and Irwin 2000; Irwin and Taylor 2001),
thus making it difficult to determine whether it is pun-
ishment or overlapping generations that is the predomi-
nant factor influencing the evolution of helping. A more
direct evaluation of the condition of invasion of strong
reciprocity is required to delineate the impact of limited
dispersal and kin selection on both the direct and indirect
fitness benefits received by strong reciprocators.
The second question is whether strong reciprocity can
actually evolve when both helping and punishment co-
evolve as independent traits. There is indeed no a priori
reason to assume that no recombination occurs between
helping and punishment so that both traits cannot seg-
regate from each other (Gardner and West 2004; Lehmann
and Keller 2006). Gardner et al. (2006) have studied an
analytical model of the coevolution of punishment and
helping in panmictic populations and have demonstrated
that helping and punishment cannot invade the population
unless Hamilton’s rule is satisfied. In other words, with
recombination occurring between helping and punish-
ment, strong reciprocity does not promote the evolution
of helping in any special situation in panmictic popula-
tions, and one might ask if this result holds in spatially
subdivided populations as well.
The third question is whether a cultural transmission
of strong reciprocity may affect the selective pressure on
the trait. While several authors have suggested similarities
between the selective pressures on genetically and cultur-
ally determined helping traits (Werren and Pulliam 1981;
Feldman et al. 1985; Allison 1991), others (Gintis 2000;
Bowles et al. 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003) have
stressed that standard evolutionary theory cannot explain
helping traits in humans and that alternatives such as “cul-
tural group selection” are needed. Such claims are cur-
rently not supported by thorough mathematical analyses,
and the conditions under which cultural and genetic trans-
mission can lead to different selective pressures on the
evolution of strong reciprocity remain to be identified.
In this article we present a mathematical model that
extends previous work on the coevolution of helping and
punishment (Boyd and Richerson 1992; Sigmund et al.
2001; Bowles and Gintis 2004; Gardner and West 2004;
Nakamaru and Iwasa 2005, 2006; Brandt et al. 2006; Gard-
ner et al. 2006) by letting both recombination and spatial
structure jointly determine the evolutionary dynamics of
punishment and helping. While our model assumes a ge-
netic transmission of the traits, we also discuss variants of
this model that allow us to consider cultural transmission
as well. The main aim of our analysis is to establish the
conditions under which expressing punishment condi-
tionally in subdivided populations can in itself promote
the evolution of costly helping and punishment without
any other confounding factor possibly leading to selection
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on these traits (e.g., repeated interactions, overlapping
generations, kin recognition, special modes of dispersal,
special modes of population demography, special modes
of competition between groups, enforcement by an insti-
tution or a cultural norm, specific cognitive preferences).
A second aim is to determine the nature of the selective
forces involved in the evolution of strong reciprocity and
under what situations it qualifies as altruistic sensu Ham-
ilton (1964a, 1970).
We demonstrate that when helping and punishment are
perfectly linked traits with no recombination occurring
between them, strong reciprocity can invade a population
of defectors when rare (i.e., ). However, this is truep r 0
only when the population is spatially structured and when
two individuals sampled from the same deme are more
likely to bear the same genes (or memes) inherited from
a common ancestor than two individuals sampled from
two different demes. Different modes of cultural trans-
mission may increase, decrease, or not alter at all the se-
lective pressure on strong reciprocity obtained under ge-
netic transmission. But our models also demonstrate that
when the recombination between helping and punishment
is stronger than selection, strong reciprocity cannot invade
a population of defectors when its initial frequency is low
(this being true whatever the structure of the population).
Then, strong reciprocity can be selected for only if an
external mechanism allows it to reach a threshold initial
frequency and if kin selection is operating. While our mod-
els show that strong reciprocity can evolve in groups of
large size, none of the models of genetic and cultural group
selection indicate that strong reciprocity is likely to evolve
in a situation of anonymous and nonrepeated interactions.
Hence, our results suggest that critics (Hagen and Ham-
merstein 2006; West et al. 2006) of the interpretations of
cooperation in experimental games have to be taken very
seriously.
Model
Life Cycle
Let us posit that evolution occurs in a population following
Wright’s infinite island model of dispersal where individ-
uals live in demes of finite size N (see table 1 for a list of
symbols). We assume that each individual in each deme
interacts with its neighbors and that an interactionN 1
consists of two stages. In the first stage, individuals help
each other. We assume that bearing a mutant helping allele
H at a first locus results in a total fecundity cost forC H
the actor and a total fecundity benefit for the recipientsB
of the behavior. Accordingly, during each of its N 1
interactions, an actor provides a benefit to itsB/(N 1)
partner at a direct fecundity cost to himself.C /(N 1)H
During the second stage, individuals bearing a mutant
punishment allele P at a second locus conditionally express
an act of punishment on their partners who have not
expressed helping during the first stage of the interaction.
During a single interaction, punishment results in a fe-
cundity cost to the actor and decreases theC /(N 1)P
fecundity of the recipient by . Since each actorD/(N 1)
interacts with neighbors, expressing the punishmentN 1
allele results in a fecundity cost for the actor and aC P
total decrease by of the fecundity of neighbors wheneverD
there are no helpers among the neighbors of the actor.
Those individuals that bear the resident allele at the pun-
ishment and/or helping locus do not express any phe-
notype at that locus. We assume a haploid life cycle (e.g.,
Seger 1985; Kirkpatrick et al. 2002) with events occurring
in the following order: (1) individuals produce a large
number of juveniles according to their fecundity deter-
mined by the round of social interactions; (2) each juvenile
disperses independently from each other with probability
m to another deme and adults die; (3) juveniles fuse ran-
domly to produce diploid zygotes (syngamy), which is
immediately followed by meiosis with a recombination
rate r between the helping and punishment loci to produce
a new generation of haploid individuals; (4) regulation
occurs with the effect that only N individuals settle in each
patch.
We investigate two different variants of this life cycle.
First, we assume that recombination is absent ( ) andrp 0
evaluate the selective pressure on strong reciprocators (in-
dividuals bearing the helping and punishment alleles)
when introduced in a monomorphic population of un-
conditional defectors (who never cooperate and never
punish). Second, we assume that recombination occurs as
described for stage 3 of the life cycle. This leads to the
presence of four gametes coevolving in the population,
and we ask whether helping (allele H) and punishment
(allele P) are selected for when introduced at low frequency
in the population.
For the interpretation of the results, we recall that when
interactions between individuals consist only of the help-
ing stage (no punishment), the direction of selection on
the helping allele is given by
C 1 0. (2)H
Helping is selected for only if the actor’s fecundity, that
is, the number of its juveniles counted before any com-
petition stage, is increased (Taylor 1992a). Taylor (1992b),
has further demonstrated that this result is true whatever
the dispersal distribution in the population (e.g., island
model of dispersal as described above, stepping-stone dis-
persal). Here, we ask whether introducing conditional
punishment can in itself affect Taylor’s rule andC 1 0H
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Table 1: List of symbols
Symbol Definition
N Deme size
m Migration rate
r Recombination rate between gametes
CH Fecundity cost of expressing the helping allele
B Fecundity benefit generated by expressing the helping allele
CP Fecundity cost of expressing punishment
D Reduction in fecundity resulting from expressing punishment
wij Fitness of individual j breeding in deme i
fij Effects of actors on the fecundity of individual j breeding in deme i
fi Effects of actors on the average fecundity in deme i
f Effect of actors on the average fecundity of demes different than i
c Net effect on its fitness of an individual bearing both the helping and the punishment allele (i.e.,
strong-reciprocator)
cH Net effect on its fitness of an individual bearing the helping allele
cP Net effect on its fitness of an individual bearing the punishment allele
p Frequency of strong reciprocators in the population
pH Average frequency of the helping allele in the population
pP Average frequency of the punishment allele in the population
z p p  pA(ij) A(ij) A Centered variable at locus A
R Relatedness between actor and recipient (evaluated in a neutral model)
DPH Covariance between an allele H and an allele P sampled in the same individual. In the neutral case,
.D p 0PH
DH/H Covariance between two alleles H sampled in two individuals from the same deme. In the neutral case,
.D p p (1 p )RH/H H H
DP/P Covariance between two alleles P sampled in two individuals from the same deme. In the neutral case,
.D p p (1 p )RP/P P P
DP/H Covariance between one allele H and one allele P sampled in two individuals from the same deme. In
the neutral case, .D p 0P/H
DP/H/H Association between two alleles H and one allele P sampled in three different individuals from the
same deme. In the neutral case, .D p 0P/H/H
DP/P/H Association between two alleles P and one allele H sampled in three different individuals from the
same deme. In the neutral case, .D p 0P/P/H
DHP/H Association between two alleles H and one allele P where one allele H and allele P are sampled from
the same individual and the second allele H is sampled from a different individual. In the neutral
case, .D p 0HP/H
DHP/P Association between two alleles P and one allele H where one allele P and allele H are sampled from
the same individual and the second allele P is sampled from a different individual. In the neutral
case, .D p 0HP/P
whether recombination between helping and punishment
may alter this effect.
Gene Dynamics
In order to investigate the coevolutionary dynamics of
helping and punishment, we use the multilocus framework
presented in Kirkpatrick et al. (2002) or Gardner et al.
(2006) and extended by Roze and Rousset (2005) to in-
clude subdivided populations with finite deme size. The
change in frequency of allele A (H or P) over one gen-
eration in the population can be written as
Dp p E[w p ] p , (3)A ij A(ij) A
where is the expected number of offspring that willwij
breed in the next generation (i.e., fitness) of individual j
breeding in deme i, is the frequency of allele A inpA(ij)
that individual (0 or 1), and designates the averagepA
frequency of allele A in the population. The expectation
in equation (3) is taken over all individuals and all demes.
Since the population is assumed to be of constant size,
the mean fitness is equal to 1 ( ), and one canE[w ]p 1ij
recognize equation (3) as being the Price equation (Ham-
ilton 1970; Price 1970). The change in allele frequency is
equivalently given by
Dp p E[w z ], (4)A ij A(ij)
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where is a centered variable.z p p  pA(ij) A(ij) A
Fitness Function
The fitness of individual j in deme i depends on bothwij
its expected number of offspring reaching adulthood in
deme i and on those reaching adulthood in other demes
after dispersing. These two components of fitness depend
on the fecundity of individual j in deme i. Without loss
of generality, it is sufficient to consider the fecundity of
an individual relative to the fecundity in a population
without helping or punishment. Relative fecundity will be
written as , where is the total effect of individuals1 f fij ij
bearing the mutant allele on the fecundity of individual j
in deme i, composed of the effects of the individual himself
and its neighbors, which is given byN 1
N
1
f p [C p  Bpij H H(ij) H(ik)N 1 kp1, k(j
 C (1 p )p  D(1 p )p ]. (5)P H(ik) P(ij) H(ij) P(ik)
In this equation and designate, respectively, thep pH(ik) P(ik)
frequencies (0 or 1) of the helping and punishment alleles
in individual k breeding in deme i.
A fraction of the offspring of individual j in deme1m
i remain philopatric and compete with a relative number
of juveniles produced in deme i and an average1 fi
relative number of immigrant juveniles produced in1 f
different demes. The effect of actors in deme i on the
average relative fecundity of individuals in that deme reads
N
1
f p f , (6)i ikN kp1
while the effect of actors on the average relative fecundity
of individuals in different demes is given by
nd1
fp f , (7) hn  1 hp1, h(id
which according to our infinite island model assumptions
is evaluated in the limit of an infinite number of demesnd
( ).n r d
A complementary fraction m of the offspring of indi-
vidual j in deme i disperse and enter in competition with
a relative number of offspring produced in different1 f
demes than i. Collecting all components of fitness gives
the fitness of individual j in deme i as
1 fijw p (1m)ij [ ](1m)(1 f )m(1 f )i
1 fijm . (8)( )1 f
Following Hamilton (1964a, 1970) and Grafen (1985),
we categorize behaviors according to their effects on the
fitness of actors and recipients. An action is altruistic (vs.
spiteful) with respect to a particular recipient when it de-
creases the fitness of the actor and increases (vs. decreases)
the fitness of the recipient. Individual j in deme i is al-
truistic with respect to a neighbor when he helps the neigh-
bor because the action decreases its fitness . Similarly,wij
individual j in deme i is spiteful with respect to a neighbor
when he punishes the neighbor because the act of pun-
ishment decreases . Other authors (e.g., Gintis 2000;wij
Bowles and Gintis 2004) define altruism from effects on
fecundity. In that case, individual j in deme i is altruistic
with respect to a neighbor when he increases the fecundity
of the neighbor while decreasing its own fecundity . Thisfij
procedure misses out consequences of the action of an
individual on its fitness ( is also involved in in eq. [8]),f fij i
a point that will be illustrated below.
Intensities of Selection
Expanding equation (8) into a Taylor series with respect
to the phenotypic effects on fitness ( , , , and )C C B DH P
allows us to investigate the coevolutionary dynamic of
helping and punishment under various intensities of se-
lection. The classical “weak selection” approach of pop-
ulation genetics usually evaluates the change in allele fre-
quency to the first order in phenotypic effects only
(first-order Taylor expansions around , ,C p 0 C p 0H P
, and ), thus neglecting terms of higher orderBp 0 Dp 0
of magnitude. The change in frequency of allele A (here
H or P) under such conditions is given by
2 2Dp p E[(f  f (1m) (f  f ))z ]O(d ), (9)A ij i A(ij)
where d is the largest of the four phenotypic effects on
fecundity of our model. Expressing all the gene frequencies
appearing in the expectation of this equation in terms of
centered variables ( ) and taking the ex-p p p  zA(ij) A A(ij)
pectation gives a decomposition of the selective pressure
in terms of coefficients of selection and associations of
alleles within and between individuals (see the appendix
in the online edition of the American Naturalist). For in-
stance, the associations within individuals involve the ge-
netic variance (e.g., ) and the linkage disequilib-2E[z ]H(ij)
rium ( ), while the associations betweenE[z z ]H(ij) P(ij)
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individuals involve intraloci (e.g., ) and inter-E[z z ]H(ij) H(ik)
loci (e.g., ) measures of relatedness betweenE[z z ]H(ij) P(ik)
individuals (Kirkpatrick et al. 2002; Roze and Rousset
2005; Gardner et al. 2006). The resulting selective pressures
on helping and punishment are presented in equations
(A10) and (A12) in the appendix in the online edition of
the American Naturalist.
In general, selection will affect genetic associations.
However, we can neglect this effect (of order d) when we
compute the change in frequency of the mutant allele to
the first order in d because associations are multiplied by
selection coefficients, which are of order d. Therefore, it
is sufficient to compute associations under neutrality. In
other words, the effect of selection on the distribution of
the mutant alleles in demes is neglected, with the result
that the linkage disequilibrium will be 0 at equilibrium
(Roze and Rousset 2005). However, relatedness will build
up, and the selective pressure on an allele will depend on
intralocus kin selection effects.
Here, we also investigate the change in allele frequency
to the second order in the largest of the four phenotypic
effects in absolute value ( , , , and ), thus allowingC C B DH P
the expression of stronger forms of selection that may
generate linkage disequilibrium. In this case, the selective
pressure on an allele will depend on genetic covariances
within and between individuals at the same and at different
loci (i.e., this takes into account intralocus as well as in-
terloci kin selection effects). When the change in gene
frequency of allele A (here H or P) is evaluated to the
second order in the phenotypic effects, we have
2Dp p E[(f  f (1m) (f  f ))z ]A ij i A(ij)
2 2 E[(f f (1m) {f (2mf f ) (1m)f  ff }ij j ij j ij
2 3m{1m(1m)}f )z ]O(d ). (10)A(ij)
The first expectation involves only the linear effect on
fitness, and the associations in this expression must now
be evaluated to the first order in phenotypic effects so that
the change in gene frequency is ascertained by all second-
order terms (quadratic in phenotypic effects) generated by
selection. The associations evaluated to the first order in
d are equal to the associations evaluated in the neutral
case plus a deviation due to the effect of selection (Roze
and Rousset 2005). Hence, the effect of selection on the
distribution of the mutant allele within and between demes
is now taken into account. By contrast, the second ex-
pectation already involves a quadratic effect on fitness (e.g.,
, ), and it is thus sufficient to evaluate the associations2B CD
in it in the neutral process only.
In all our calculations, we assume that both the migra-
tion rate and the recombination rate are stronger than
selection so that the genetic associations reach their steady
state before any significant change in allele frequency has
occurred at the level of the population. This “quasi-equi-
librium” assumption is widely used in population genetic
theory (e.g., Kimura 1965; Nagylaki 1993; Bu¨rger 2000;
Kirkpatrick et al. 2002; Roze and Rousset 2005) and allows
us to conveniently express the associations in terms of
gene frequencies and model parameters. However, the cal-
culation of the various associations appearing in equation
(10) remains extremely tedious, and we used the recursions
for associations as automated by F. Rousset and D. Roze
(unpublished manuscript). This program was used to ob-
tain the explicit form of the selective pressure (given by
equation [10]) on both helping and punishment under
second-order effects, and these equations are presented in
the Mathematica notebook “Strong reciprocity” in the on-
line edition of the American Naturalist.1 Readers are invited
to contact the authors for future updates of this Mathe-
matica notebook.
Results
No Recombination between Helping and Punishment
To study the evolution of strong reciprocity in the absence
of recombination (i.e., ), we set and equalrp 0 p pH(ij) P(ij)
to a single value, , in equation (5). The change in thep(ij)
frequency p of strong reciprocators can then be obtained
from the appendix either from equation (A10) (by sub-
stituting all subscripts with ) or from equation (A12)H P
(by substituting all subscripts with ). The resultingP H
change in frequency (eq. [A13]) is a complicated function
of the parameters, which, to the first order in , becomes1/N
Dpp p(1 p){C  (1 p)C  pDH P
 [B (1 p)C  pD]R (11)P
2 R (1m) [B C  (1 2p)(C  D)]R },H P
where
1 N 1
RR p  R (12)( )N N
is the relatedness between a focal individual and an in-
dividual sampled with replacement from its deme (thus
including the focal individual with probability ). The1/N
coefficient R measures the relatedness between two dif-
ferent individuals sampled in the same patch (given here
1 Code that appears in the American Naturlist has not been peer-reviewed,
nor does the journal provide support.
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by Wright’s (1951) measure of population structure
), which is related to the preceding equation byR{ FST
2 RRp (1m) R , (13)
because with probability , two individuals descend2(1m)
from the same deme, and with probability , they de-1/N
scend from the same parent.
According to equation (11), the change in frequency p
of strong reciprocators in the population is frequency de-
pendent and is a function of three components. The first
is , which is equivalent to the se-C  (1 p)C  pDH P
lective pressure on strong reciprocity obtained in a pan-
mictic population (see eq. [1]). The second is [B (1
, which is the change in the relative fecundityp)C  pD]RP
of a focal strong reciprocator resulting from its neighbors
being strong reciprocators. It depends on the benefit BR
conferred by strong reciprocators to the focal individual,
on a benefit resulting from the focal individual(1 p)C RP
not expressing punishment to the same extent as in a
panmictic population because its neighbors are likely to
be strong reciprocators, and on the cost because thepDR
advantage for a strong reciprocator relative to defectors of
not being punished decreases when its neighbors are also
strong reciprocators. Finally, the third is a term (third line)
that is the change in competition in the focal deme re-
sulting from all strong reciprocators in the focal deme
expressing helping and punishment. This term is weighted
by , which represents the probability that two off-2(1m)
spring produced in the same deme compete against each
other.
Substituting equation (13) into equation (11) informs
us that the fecundity benefit B conferred by a strong re-
ciprocator to its neighbor, is canceled out by the concom-
itant increase in kin competition in exactly the same way
as occurs in Taylor’s (1992a) model. By contrast, the effect
on fecundity does not cancel out because punishmentD
is expressed only conditionally, and an individual express-
ing punishment will never be punished because he also
expresses helping. Consequently, punishment can only
benefit relatives indirectly (through the reduction of com-
petition), and it cannot directly harm them. Limited dis-
persal increases the selective pressure on strong recipro-
cators because common genealogy results in the
association of individuals bearing identical genotypes. This
means that strong reciprocators are likely to benefit from
a reduced local competition stemming from other strong
reciprocators expressing harming toward defectors. This
raises the question of whether this kin selective pressure
may favor the spread of strong reciprocators when their
initial frequency is close to 0. By letting in the termp r 0
in brackets in equation (11), we find that this occurs when
R(D 2C  C ) 1 C  C . (14)P H H P
Whether a focal strong reciprocator is altruistic when
strong reciprocity is favored by selection when rare in the
population depends on the effect of its behavior on itsc
own fitness. This effect on fitness is obtained from equa-
tion (A13) by setting and in the braces. Thus,Rp 0 pp 0
2(1m) (C  C  D B)P Hcp C  C  , (15)H P N
which depends on both the direct costs from expressing
strong reciprocity and the indirect benefits resulting from
the decrease in competition in the focal deme. The change
in competition induced by a strong reciprocator depends
on the additional number of(C  C  D B)(1m)P H
offspring coming in competition in the focal deme re-
sulting from the focal strong reciprocator expressing the
behavior and on the probability that this in-(1m)/N
crement in competition will displace its own offspring.
Comparing equations (14) and (15) reveals that there
is a range of parameter values under which andc ! 0
where strong reciprocity can spread in the population (i.e.,
altruistic strong reciprocity can invade and is stable). In
figure 1, we compare the selective pressure on strong rec-
iprocity (the term in braces in eq. [11]) and the effect of
an actor on its fitness (eq. [15]) as a function of the mi-
gration rate m and deme size N. Increased rates of dispersal
or greater deme size generally lead to a shift from strong
reciprocity being selfish to being altruistic because the act
of punishment provides less benefits to an actor in terms
of reduced competition in its deme. But when the dispersal
rate or patch size become large, the relatedness between
patch members tends toward 0. In that case, strong rec-
iprocity is counterselected since it provides no indirect
benefits to relatives. Finally, from equation (15) we also
see that strong reciprocity is more likely to be altruistic
when the benefit of helping B is high and when the damage
of punishment D is small.
Recombination between Helping and Punishment
Weak Selection (First-Order Effects). With recombination,
we must follow the change in frequency of both the helping
( ) and punishment ( ) alleles. From equation (A10),p pH P
the change in frequency of the helping allele is given to
the first-order phenotypic effects on fitness (weak selec-
tion) by
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Figure 1: Signs of both the total selective pressure on strong reciprocity (eq. [14]) and the direct effect of an actor on its fitness (eq. [15]) whenc
allele p is rare ( ). Gray shading indicates positive signs, white shading indicates negative signs. A, Signs as a function of the dispersal rate m.p r 0
Parameter values are , , , , and . B, Signs as a function of deme size N. Same parameter values as panelNp 10 C p 0.01 C p 0.01 Bp 0.2 Dp 0.5H P
A except .mp 0.2
Dp p p (1 p ){C  BRH H H H
2 R (1m) (B C )R (16)H
2 R p [D C R (1m) (D C )R ]}.P P P
The first term (CH) in the braces of this equation is the
direct cost of helping, the second term (BR) is the kin-
selected benefits of helping, and the third term ((1
)is the increase in kin competition resulting2 Rm) (B C )RH
from all actors in the focal deme expressing helping. The
remaining terms in equation (16) are the additional se-
lective pressures on helping stemming from actors pun-
ishing individuals that do not express helping. This term
depends of the frequency of punishers in the populationpP
and consists of three components. The first is the direct
benefit of expressing helping and thus not being punished.
The second is an indirect benefit, which results from a
punisher that also bears the helping allele and who does
not express the cost of punishment because the focal actors
express helping. Finally, the last term is an indirect cost
resulting from the increase in competition in the focal
deme associated with punishers bearing the helping allele
and not expressing any punishment in the focal patch as
a result of the focal individual expressing helping.
Substituting equation (13) into equation (16) and sim-
plifying informs us that helping is selected for when
Dp  C 1 0. (17)P H
Helping is a better strategy than the alternate option of
defecting if the frequency of punishers in the population
times the decrease in fecundity resulting from punishment
exceeds the cost of helping. As was the case for the previous
model, the fecundity benefit that an actor of helpingB
confers to its neighbors is canceled out by the concomitant
increase in kin competition generated by the act of helping.
Helping spreads only if it increases the fecundity of the
focal individual, a result that can be interpreted as being
an application of Taylor’s model (1992a; 1992b). There-
fore, the condition is likely to hold, what-Dp  C 1 0P H
ever the dispersal distribution (e.g., island model of dis-
persal, stepping-stone model of dispersal).
Helping can be altruistic if it results in a negative effect
on the fitness of the actor. The effect of an act of helping
on the fitness of the actor is obtained from equation (16)
by setting the relatedness between different individuals in
the braces of equation (16) to 0 ( , ), whichRRp 0 R p 1/N
gives
c p Dp  CH P H
2(1m) (B C ) p (D C )H P P , (18)
N
Evolution of Altruistic Punishment 29
where the term weighted by is the change in the in-1/N
tensity of competition in the focal deme resulting from an
actor expressing helping. From this equation we see that
there is a range of parameter values where Dp  C 1P H
is consistent with a negative effect of helping on the0
fitness of the actor.
From equation (A12), the change in frequency of the
punishment allele is given by
Dp p p (1 p )(1 p )P P P H
2 R# [C  DR (1m) (D C )R ], (19)P P
which is formally equivalent to the selective pressure on
helping (eq. [16]) in the absence of punishment (substitute
with in eq. [19] and compare with the first andD B
second line of eq. [16]). Substituting the equilibrium value
of into equation (19) and simplifying, we find that pun-R
ishment spreads when
C 1 0. (20)P
Punishment can spread only if the act of punishment re-
sults in a direct fecundity benefit for the actor. The effect
on fecundity has canceled out because, contrary to theD
model where punishment and helping are coded by the
same gene (eq. 11), an individual expressing punishment
is also likely to be punished. Hence, punishment indirectly
benefits relatives (through the reduction of competition)
but directly costs them when they do not bear the helping
allele. This model can again be interpreted as being a spe-
cial application of Taylor’s (1992a) model, and it also il-
lustrates that the results established by Gardner et al.
(2006) for panmictic populations extent to subdivided
populations as well.
Punishment results in a change in the direct fitness of
the actor by magnitude
2(1m) (D C )Pc p (1 p )C  . (21)P H P[ ]N
The second term in the brackets of this equation is positive
because punishment reduces the intensity of competition
in the focal deme, which increases the likelihood that an
offspring of an actor will reach adulthood. Contrary to
helping, punishment cannot be altruistic when the con-
dition for its evolution is satisfied.
Stronger Selection (Second-Order Effects). In order to as-
sess whether the results established in the previous section
also hold under stronger forms of selection, we evaluated
the changes in frequency of helping and punishment to
the second-order phenotypic effects on fitness. This in-
troduces two complications. First, there are additional
components in the selective pressures, quadratic in ,B
, , and , because the second expectation of equationC D CH P
(10) has to be taken into account. Second, the covariances
in the first expectation of equation (10), which appear
when the fecundities ( , , and f) are expressed in termsf fij i
of centered variables ( ), have to be eval-p p p  zA(ij) A A(ij)
uated to the first order in phenotypic effects. These genetic
associations are now affected by an interaction between
selection and common genealogy. In order to follow the
coevolutionary dynamic of helping and punishment, we
thus have to track the change of both the gene frequencies
and the genetic associations within and between individ-
uals. The explicit expressions of the associations are given
in equations (A18)–(A23), and the total selective pressures
on punishment and helping are very cumbersome and are
presented in the Mathematica notebook “Strong reci-
procity” in the online edition of the American Naturalist.
Under our quasi-equilibrium analysis, we distinguish the
situation where both the helping and punishment are ini-
tially rare from the situation where the initial frequency
of one allele is not vanishingly small, because they differ
qualitatively.
In the situation where both the helping allele H and the
punishment allele P are initially rare ( andp r 0 p rH P
), the evolutionary development of one allele is inde-0
pendent of the other allele because all frequency-depen-
dent terms cancel, a consequence of the fact that allele
frequency is vanishingly small. In that case, only relat-
edness between individuals at homologous loci matters,
and we find that the second-order condition of invasion
of punishment is less stringent than the first-order con-
dition given by equation [20]. Allele P can now be selected
for in the presence of a fecundity cost ( ). Indeed,C 1 0P
under second-order effects, the effect of selection on re-
latedness is taken into account, and punishment results in
a decrease in relatedness between patch members (see eq.
[A22]). A focal punisher is then less likely to be punished
from defecting in the focal patch, a situation decreasing
the selective pressure against punishment. Actually, pun-
ishment here can simply be envisioned as an indiscrimi-
nate “harming” behavior that is likely to spread because
a focal individual reduces competition for its own offspring
by harming all other individuals in its patch, an action
resulting in a benefit to self. From the analysis of the total
selective pressure, we found that allele P will spread only
if the behavior results in a positive effect on the fitness
( ) of a focal individual, which, to the first order inc P
, is given by1/N
2(1m) (1 C )(D C )P Pc p C  . (22)P P N
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Figure 2: Signs of both the total selective pressure on punishment and the direct effect of an actor on its fitness when allele is rare (c p p rP P P
). Gray shading indicates positive effect, white shading indicates negative effect. A, Signs as a function of the benefit . Parameter values are0 B
, , , , , , and . B, Signs as a function of the damage . Same parameter values as panelp p 0.5 Np 10 mp 0.1 rp 0.5 C p 0.01 C p 0.01 Dp 0.2 DH H P
A except . C, Signs as a function of the frequency of the helping allele in the population. Same parameter values as panel A except thatBp 0.5 pH
and .Bp 0.5 Dp 0.25
Although a focal individual can bear a fecundity cost
( ), the allele spreads only if it results in a net fitnessC 1 0P
benefit for that individual ( ). By contrast to pun-c 1 0P
ishment, the condition of invasion of helping with second-
order phenotypic effects is more stringent than the con-
dition with only first-order effects (eq. [17]). An
explanation for this is that relatedness between two patch
members is reduced when the effect of helping on relat-
edness is taken into account (see eq. [A20]), which further
reduces the kin-selected benefits. Costly helping ( )C 1 0H
can therefore not invade in the absence of punishment.
Notice that the results discussed in this paragraph cor-
roborate the results obtained with the approximations de-
veloped in the section “Weak Selection.”
By contrast, when the initial frequency of the helping
and/or punishment allele(s) is not vanishingly small
( and/or ), associations between the helpingp 1 0 p 1 0H P
and the punishment alleles influence the selective pressure.
The analysis of the selective pressures indicates that se-
lection on punishment becomes positive frequency de-
pendent with respect to the helping allele. That is, there
is a threshold frequency of thep (C , B, C , D, m, N, r)H, T H P
helping allele where punishment is selected for when rare
( ) and which is determined by the costs, the benefits,p r 0P
and the demographic parameters of the population.
Whether such punishment qualifies as altruistic or selfish
also depends on all these parameters. Inspecting equation
(A25) suggests that increasing the benefit ( ) may resultB
in altruistic punishment because by helping, punishers en-
hance the competition for their own offspring, thus in-
creasing the net fitness cost of helping. By contrast, high
values of the damage ( ) may result in selfish strategiesD
because the act of punishment reduces competition for
the offspring of the actor. In figure 2, we compare the
effect of an actor on its fitness ( ; eq. [A25]) and thec P
selective pressure on punishment as a function of , ,B D
and . From figure 2, it can be seen that when the fre-pH
quency of helping is not vanishingly small and is highB
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Figure 3: Equilibrium frequencies of the helping allele ( ) and pun-pˆH
ishment allele ( ) under both second-order phenotypic effects on fitnesspˆP
and a model of recurrent mutations (here with probability anmp 0.01
allele at a locus mutates into its alternative right before regulation)
graphed as a function of migration. The upper line is the equilibrium
frequency of helping obtained from the analytical model under strongpˆH
selection, and the triangles represent the mean frequency of allele H in
the population obtained from simulations. The lower line is the equilib-
rium frequency of punishment obtained from the analytical model,pˆP
and the stars represent the mean frequencies of allele P obtained from
simulations. Parameter values are , , ,Np 10 rp 0.5 C p 0.005 C pH P
, , and . In simulations, exact expressions for fe-0.005 Bp 0.2 Dp 0.2
cundity were used, and regulation occurred by multinomial sampling of
gametes. Simulation results are means over 100,000 generations of evo-
lution of a population of 100 demes starting with initial conditions
and . Mutations were incorporated in the analyticalˆ ˆp p 0.5 p p 0.5H P
model by using equations (27) and (28) of Kirkpatrick et al. (2002) with
symmetric mutation rate m.
and/or is low, punishment can simultaneously be al-D
truistic and selected for. Increasing dispersal or deme size
also generally leads to punishment becoming an altruistic
rather than a selfish strategy. Similar to the first-order
approximation (eq. [17]), selection on helping becomes
positive frequency dependent with respect to the punish-
ment allele when the frequency of punishment is not
vanishingly small. There is a threshold frequency
of the punishment allele wherep (C , B, C , D, m, N, r)P, T H P
helping is selected for when rare ( ). This thresholdp r 0H
frequency is given by when phenotypic effects are ofC/D
first order (eq. [17]), and it is slightly lower when phe-
notypic effects are of second order ( ), with thep ! C/DP, T
result that selection on helping is slightly increased with
a decrease in the dispersal rate and deme size. When the
threshold frequencies are satisfied ( , ),p 1 p p 1 pP P, T H H, T
the alleles can invade the population and go to fixation
so that all individuals will ultimately behave as strong re-
ciprocators. We finally mention that we observed some
instances of stable polymorphism at the punishment locus
in the situation where helping does not result in any benefit
( ).Bp 0
In order to check the validity of our equations, we also
performed simulations in which we evaluated the equilib-
rium allele frequencies maintained by a balance between
selection and a regime of recurrent mutations. Figure 3
compares the steady state frequencies of the punishment
allele ( ) and helping allele ( ) obtained from thep pH P
second-order analytical model by incorporating mutations
with those obtained from simulations. Since the simula-
tions are only for checking purposes, no attempt was made
to model mutation in a realistic manner. The simulations
generally confirm the analytic results obtained by taking
into account second-order phenotypic effects on fitness.
Under stronger forms of selection (crudely, when phe-
notypic effects exceed 0.2), the selective pressures on pun-
ishment and helping obtained from the analytical model
by taking second-order effects into account overestimate
the selective pressure observed in the simulations. This
suggests that the exact selective pressures lie in between
the first- and second-order predictions obtained with the
analytical models.
Discussion
Strong reciprocity has been proposed as a potent mech-
anism promoting altruism and cooperation in humans,
but there has been no thorough analysis of the conditions
conducive to its emergence and spread within populations.
Here we investigated the selective pressure on strong rec-
iprocity and the conditions for its evolution when both
recombination and spatial structure jointly determine the
coevolutionary dynamics of punishment and helping. The
results of our population genetic derivations suggest that
in the absence of recombination between helping and pun-
ishment, strong reciprocity can invade a spatially struc-
tured population at all allele frequencies. In particular,
strong reciprocity can be selected for when its initial fre-
quency is small (i.e., rare mutants can invade). In that
case, strong reciprocity qualifies as altruistic or selfish de-
pending on the value of the parameters of the model.
Further, the selective force operating is kin selection. By
contrast, when recombination occurs between helping and
punishment, strong reciprocity cannot invade a population
of defectors when its initial frequency is low unless pun-
ishing results in a direct fecundity benefit. However, strong
reciprocity can be selected for in subdivided populations
if its initial frequency is greater than a given threshold that
is determined by the demographic parameters of the pop-
ulation (table 2 summarizes the situations in which rare
mutants invading the population are altruistic).
No Recombination between Helping and Punishment
Our analyses corroborate the findings that limited dis-
persal facilitates the spread of strong reciprocity under the
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Table 2: Conditions under which rare mutants invading the population can be altruistic
Models To be or not to be altruistic
Helping and punishment linked Strong reciprocity can be altruistic
Helping and punishment not linked (weak selection) Helping can be altruistic while
punishment can only be selfish
Helping and punishment not linked (stronger selection):
(a) Both mutants are rare Helping can be altruistic while
punishment can only be selfish
(b) Helping is rare, punishment is not rare Helping can be altruistic
(c) Punishment is rare, helping is not rare Punishment can be altruistic
assumption that both punishment and helping are com-
pletely linked traits (i.e., strong reciprocity is a single Men-
delian trait; Bowles and Gintis 2004; Nakamaru and Iwasa
2005, 2006). Strong reciprocity can invade when rare and
go to fixation in the population, but our model shows that
the condition for the invasion may be independent of the
benefits of helping. This result has to our knowledge never
been discussed in the literature and stems from the fact
that the fecundity benefit that an actor confers to itsB
neighbors is exactly canceled out by the concomitant in-
crease in kin competition generated by the act of helping
(Taylor 1992a, 1992b). Strong reciprocators are selected
for not because they increase the productivity (by helping)
of other individuals in the deme but because they decrease
(by harming) the fitness of individuals that do not bear
the trait and thus reduce locally the intensity of compe-
tition. Limited dispersal and small deme size both increase
the likelihood that strong reciprocators will benefit from
the reduction of competition resulting from relatives
harming defectors by punishment. Helping is thus essen-
tially used as a tag that allows one to identify individuals
that do not bear the punishment allele and to exclude
them from the population. This is in line with the view
that punishment can be interpreted as a “spiteful” strategy
(Nakamaru and Iwasa 2006). In fact, any tag associated
with punishment would help detecting those individuals
that do not bear the punishment allele and then reduce
their fitness by harming. Accordingly, strong reciprocators
are functioning like “green beards” (Hamilton 1964b;
Dawkins 1982; Lehmann and Keller 2006). This is exactly
the situation that has been reported in the fire ant Solen-
opsis invicta, where workers bearing one copy of a selfish
gene kill all queens in their colony not bearing a copy of
that gene (Keller and Ross 1998). By so doing, workers
increase the fecundity of the other queens in their colony
that do bear a copy of the green beard gene.
The condition of invasion of strong reciprocity (eq.
[14]) depends on the coefficient of relatedness R between
two interacting individuals. Relatedness can take substan-
tial values for a deme of large size when migration is low
(e.g., for and ), but it can beRp 0.09 mp 0.1 Np 50
further increased under different life-cycle assumptions.
For instance, overlapping generations promote helping un-
der the life cycle investigated here even without punish-
ment (Taylor and Irwin 2000), so when generations are
overlapping, the condition for the invasion of strong rec-
iprocity will be relaxed. In particular, when reproduction
follows a Moran model (only one individual dies per unit
time; e.g., Ewens 2004), relatedness takes its maximal
value, which for large deme size becomes Rp (1/m
and takes the value of when and1)/N Rp 0.09 mp 0.1
. Importantly, in the presence of overlapping gen-Np 100
erations, the fecundity benefit generated by helping does
not cancel out in equation (11) (i.e., ), and2 RR 1 [1m] R
selection on strong reciprocity increases with an increase
in the benefit of helping.
Recombination between Helping and Punishment
The dynamics of the coevolution of helping and punish-
ment in the presence of recombination depends on the
association of genes within and between individuals at the
same and at different loci. While recombination tends to
break down the association of helping and punishment
within (i.e., linkage disequilibrium) and between individ-
uals, limited migration, finite deme size, and selection
work in the opposite direction (see eqq. [A18], [A19]).
Limited migration and finite deme size also increase the
relatedness between individuals at both the helping and
punishment loci, while the effect of selection is frequency
dependent (see eqq. [A20], [A21]).
Under weak selection (i.e., first-order phenotypic effects
on fitness), the associations of helping and punishment
within and between individuals cannot build up because
the intensity of selection favoring it is too weak relative
to the erosion brought by recombination. In that case,
only relatedness may matter, and our analysis demon-
strates that punishment evolves only if it results in a direct
fecundity benefit to the actor ( ). By contrast, theC 1 0P
conditions for helping to be selected for is frequency de-
pendent, and helping becomes a better strategy than the
alternate option of defecting when the frequency of pun-
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ishers in the population times the damage incurred by
punishment exceeds the cost of helping ( ).p D C 1 0P H
Selection on helping is thus enforced by the threat of pun-
ishment, a feature that has been reported in several in-
terspecific mutualisms in the wild (Pellmyr and Huth 1994;
Kiers et al. 2003; Bshary and Grutter 2005). Our analysis
suggest that the condition holds for anyp D C 1 0P H
migration rate and patch size, but it is also likely to hold
for lattice models with explicit space because this condition
of invasion can be interpreted as an application of Taylor’s
(1992a; 1992b) result, which holds independently of the
spatial structure of the population (see discussion of eq.
[2]).
Introducing second-order phenotypic effects on fitness
(i.e., larger phenotypic effects) generates associations be-
tween helping and punishment within and between in-
dividuals as a result of an interaction between selection
and identity by descent. Under the condition that helping
has a nonvanishingly small frequency in the population
(i.e., ), an individual bearing the punishment allelep 1 0H
is also likely to express helping and receive helping from
its neighbors. Altruistic punishment can evolve when the
value of the benefit of helping is high, the damage ofB
punishment is low, and when the dispersal rate andD
patch size are high (see fig. 2); otherwise, the trait qualifies
as selfish. Importantly, however, when the initial frequency
of helpers is close to 0, altruistic punishment is always
counterselected (see fig. 2). Similarly, when the initial fre-
quency of punishers tends toward 0, helping cannot evolve
if it results in a fecundity cost for the actor ( ).C 1 0H
Therefore, costly helping cannot evolve without punish-
ment and costly punishment cannot evolve without help-
ing. However, there are many different ways by which
helping strategies may invade spatially subdivided popu-
lations in the first place. For instance, overlapping gen-
erations, different kin-discrimination mechanisms, various
modes of dispersal, and different effects of helping on
patch demography and ecology can tip the balance in favor
of helping behaviors (van Baalen and Rand 1998; Taylor
and Irwin 2000; Perrin and Lehmann 2001; Boyd et al.
2003; Le Galliard et al. 2003; Axelrod et al. 2004; Gardner
and West 2006; Lehmann 2006; Lehmann et al. 2006).
Once helping has reached a threshold frequency through
these mechanisms, punishment can invade the population,
and because selection on helping increases with the fre-
quency of punishers (see eq. [17]), the selective pressure
on helping can subsequently be enhanced. This feedback,
in which helping raises selection on punishment and pun-
ishment then reinforces selection on helping, might result
in altruism evolving in groups of larger size, as would occur
in the absence of punishment. A similar process might
work in panmictic populations as well, where costly help-
ing can first evolve through interactions occurring among
members of a family. However, these feedback processes
are probably not irreversible once kin selection is com-
pletely suppressed, and it remains to investigate the extent
to which they can explain helping in groups of large size
or among unrelated individuals.
The results discussed in this section hold under the
assumption that recombination is stronger than selection.
Indeed, the accuracy of our quasi-equilibrium approxi-
mation (see “Model”) breaks down with very low recom-
bination rates, a situation where the selective pressure on
strong reciprocity is probably underestimated in our mod-
els. Since our model with perfect linkage indicates that
strong reciprocity can evolve when rare, it is plausible that
such evolution will also take place when recombination is
weak and selection is strong.
Genetic versus Cultural Transmission of Strong Reciprocity
We have assumed a genetic transmission of strong reci-
procity. A crucial difference with cultural transmission is
that genetic transmission occurs only vertically, whereas
cultural transmission can also be oblique and horizontal
(Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Boyd and Richerson
1985). However, a crucial similarity between these two
modes of transmission is that the concept of relatedness
applies to both of them. Under genetic transmission, re-
latedness measures the extent to which two individuals
sampled from the same group are more likely to bear the
same genes inherited from a common ancestor than two
individuals sampled from two different groups. Similarly,
under cultural transmission, relatedness measures the ex-
tent to which two individuals from the same group are
more likely to bear the same cultural variant (meme) in-
herited from a common cultural ancestor than two in-
dividuals sampled from two different groups (Werren and
Pulliam 1981; Feldman et al. 1985; Allison 1991).
Our models apply to cultural transmission under spe-
cific conditions. When helping and punishment are per-
fectly linked traits, strong reciprocity can be envisioned as
a cultural variant affecting Darwinian fitness (e.g., Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman 1981; Feldman et al. 1985), which is
transmitted from the parental to the offspring generation
between the reproduction and the dispersal stage of our
life cycle. With these assumptions, different modes of ver-
tical and/or oblique transmission of the trait will affect the
change in frequency of strong reciprocity (eq. [11]) only
to the extent that they result in a different coefficient of
kinship (see “Cultural Transmission of Strong Reciprocity”
in the appendix in the online edition of the American
Naturalist). For instance, when transmission occurs pri-
marily by parents (i.e., each offspring inherits the cultural
variant from its parent with probability t and, with com-
plementary probability , adopts the cultural variant1 t
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of one of the other parents in a deme [Feldman etN 1
al. 1985, chap. 3.11]), the cultural kinship is precisely given
by equation (13) and is independent of the value of the
parameter t (see eq. [A29]). Hence, this mode of cultural
transmission does not affect the condition of invasion of
strong reciprocity established for genetic transmission. By
contrast, when transmission occurs primarily by teachers
(i.e., each offspring inherits the cultural variant from the
same teacher with probability t, and, with complementary
probability , adopts the cultural variant of one of the1 t
other adult individuals in a deme [Feldman et al.N 1
1985, chap. 3.11]), cultural kinship may increase markedly
compared with genetic transmission (see eq. [A32]). Such
a “one to many” transmission scheme can then relax the
condition of invasion of strong reciprocity. Our models
where recombination occurs between helping and pun-
ishment can also be applied to cultural oblique transmis-
sion when cultural variants affect Darwinian fitness. In
this case, the recombination rate of our models represents
the probability that a given individual of the offspring
generation adopts the punishment and the helping traits
from two different individuals of the parental generation.
Finally, by introducing slight modifications, our models
apply to the dynamics of horizontal transmission schemes
where individuals imitate actions that perform better, with
a probability proportional to the expected payoff obtained
during the social interaction stage of our life cycle (see
“Cultural Transmission by Imitation of Strong Reciproc-
ity” in the appendix in the online edition of the American
Naturalist). This imitation rule leads to the same dynamics
as a vertically transmitted trait in panmictic populations
(Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998, p. 87). However, whether
this imitation rule leads to the same dynamics as genetic
transmission depends on additional assumptions in spa-
tially subdivided populations (see D). For instance, Boyd
et al. (2003) investigated through simulations a cultural
model of strong reciprocity with imitation in the presence
of group extinction. In the absence of group extinction,
this is very similar to our model (introducing group ex-
tinction leads in itself to a high selective pressure on help-
ing; Lehmann et al. 2006, see their eq. [9]). Boyd et al.
(2003) assume that with probability , a focal indi-1m
vidual encounters an individual from the focal group and
with probability m, an individual from a different group.
In each case, imitation occurs proportionally to payoff.
Surprisingly, under these assumptions the selective pres-
sure on strong reciprocity (eq. [A41]) is much lower than
under genetic transmission (eq. [11]). This is because un-
der transmission, through imitation of strong reciprocity,
the intensity of kin competition is increased compared
with a genetic transmission of the trait (cf. eq. [8] with
eqq. [A39]–[A41]) with the result that greater benefit B
of helping translates into greater selection against strong
reciprocity.
In conclusion, our models suggest that cultural trans-
mission may increase as well as decrease the selective pres-
sure on helping relative to the case of genetic transmission.
While genetic associations have been evaluated under myr-
iads of life cycles, the study of the extent to which modes
of cultural transmission affect cultural kinship or the fit-
ness function in subdivided populations has fallen into
oblivion. Future research should focus on how specific
modes of transmission may by themselves explain the evo-
lution of helping in groups of large size (even in the ab-
sence of punishment) and link more directly inclusive fit-
ness theory with “cultural group selection” theory (e.g.,
Henrich and Boyd 2001; Richerson and Boyd 2005). This
link might also be of practical relevance for constructing
explicit models. Indeed, where economists strive to eval-
uate the conditions of invasion and stabilities of mutant
strategies by computing the complete distributions of the
number of copies of the strategies within and among
groups (e.g., Ellison 1993; Kandori et al. 1993), adopting
an inclusive fitness approach reduces the problem to the
much simpler task of computing the probabilities that
pairs of strategies sampled within and among groups are
identical (Roze and Rousset 2003; Rousset and Ronce
2004; Rousset 2006).
Concluding Remarks
Our models suggest that kinship between interacting in-
dividuals is necessary for the evolution of strong reci-
procity with both genetic and cultural transmission. In
other words, strong reciprocity is not an alternative evo-
lutionary mechanism as is sometimes implied (Gintis
2000, 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Gintis et al. 2003;
Bowles and Gintis 2004) but merely constitutes a specific
proximate mechanism that generates a positive selective
pressure on helping and that results in inclusive fitness
benefits and/or direct benefits (self interest). Since kinship
can still be substantial in groups of large size (i.e., N ∼
), strong reciprocity can lead to the evolution of helping50
in groups of such size, especially if it is coupled with one
or several of the various demographic, ecological, and life-
history factors already selecting for helping in subdivided
populations.
With respect to these conclusions, it is important to
recall that strong reciprocity has been raised as an “ex-
planation” of cooperation in anonymous nonrepeated in-
teractions (Gintis 2000, 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003;
Bowles and Gintis 2004). Gintis et al. (2003, p. 168) specify
that subjects in experimental games are unlikely to behave
in a maladaptive way because they do not confuse the
experimental environment (i.e., anonymous nonrepeated
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interactions) with a more evolutionarily familiar situation
such as a nonanonymous repeated game in which coop-
eration is the best option. According to these comments,
neither “genetic group selection” nor “cultural group se-
lection” of strong reciprocity can be invoked as an expla-
nation for cooperation in anonymous nonrepeated
interactions because it would imply that subjects in ex-
perimental environments misinterpret the context and be-
have in a way that is adaptive in an environment of non-
random interactions (be it through genetic or cultural
kinship). Our analysis of the evolution of strong reci-
procity thus suggest that the solution to the puzzle of why
humans engage in costly helping in anonymous and non-
repeated interactions will not be solved by inventing new
models that promote strong reciprocity but rather by un-
derstanding the interpretative frames players are using in
experimental games (Hagen and Hammerstein 2006).
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